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Abstract
Tu et al present an analysis of the equivalence of three paradoxes, namely, Simpson's, Lord's, and
the suppression phenomena. They conclude that all three simply reiterate the occurrence of a
change in the association of any two variables when a third variable is statistically controlled for.
This is not surprising because reversal or change in magnitude is common in conditional analysis.
At the heart of the phenomenon of change in magnitude, with or without reversal of effect
estimate, is the question of which to use: the unadjusted (combined table) or adjusted (sub-table)
estimate. Hence, Simpson's paradox and related phenomena are a problem of covariate selection
and adjustment (when to adjust or not) in the causal analysis of non-experimental data. It cannot
be overemphasized that although these paradoxes reveal the perils of using statistical criteria to
guide causal analysis, they hold neither the explanations of the phenomenon they depict nor the
pointers on how to avoid them. The explanations and solutions lie in causal reasoning which relies
on background knowledge, not statistical criteria.
Commentary
Simpson's paradox, Lord's paradox, and the suppression
effect are examples of the perils of the statistical interpre-
tation of a real but complex world. By rearing their heads
intermittently in the literature they remind us about the
inadequacy of statistical criteria for causal analysis. Those
who believe in letting the data speak for themselves are in
for a disappointment.
Tu et al present an analysis of the equivalence of three par-
adoxes, concluding that all three simply reiterate the
unsurprising change in the association of any two varia-
bles when a third variable is statistically controlled for [1].
I call this unsurprising because reversal or change in mag-
nitude is common in conditional analysis. To avoid
either, we must avoid conditional analysis altogether.
What is it about Simpson's and Lord's paradoxes or the
suppression effect, beyond their pointing out the obvious,
that attracts the intermittent and sometimes alarmist
interests seen in the literature? Why are they paradoxes? A
paradox is a seemingly absurd or self-contradictory state-
ment or proposition that may in fact be true [2]. What is
so self-contradictory about the Simpson's, Lord's, and
suppression phenomena that may turn out to be true?
After reading the paper by Tu et al one still gets the uneasy
feeling that the paradoxes are anything but surprising, that
the statistical phenomenon they purport to represent are
in fact causal in nature, requiring a causal language not a
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with causal reasoning. So, why bother with the statistics of
these paradoxes, much less their equivalence, in the first
instance if both the correct language and resolution lie
elsewhere? Although we are given a glimpse of the appro-
priate tools (such as the implied causal calculus of
directed acyclic graphs [3-6]), we must look beyond the
authors' paper for satisfactory answers.
At the heart of the phenomenon of change in magnitude,
with or without reversal of effect estimate, is the question
of which to use: the unadjusted (combined table) or
adjusted (sub-table) estimate. Simpson's and Lord's para-
doxes generate shock when change in direction or magni-
tude (or both) of an estimate is observed while we are
thinking causes; we then start wondering which estimate
is the correct one. Suppression effect in addition frets
about model fit to assess the correctness of unadjusted
versus adjusted estimates. In each case, the researcher is
looking at statistics to tell her what she may not admit to:
which estimate must she accord causal interpretation in
what causal world? In other words, these paradoxes arise
in the context of covariate selection, especially when look-
ing to select variables for adequate control of confound-
ing in causal analysis [5]. Causal diagrams and their
related causal calculus have emerged as a mathematically
rigorous approach to depicting causal relations among
variables, making underlying causal assumptions trans-
parent, and guiding the selection of a sufficient set of cov-
ariates for consistent effect estimation [3-6]. In all causal
diagrams or directed acyclic graphs (DAGs), it is impor-
tant to note that the missing arrows are very important:
they connote what the researcher believes to be the
absence of causal effects encoded by those missing arrows.
The knowledge needed to draw these DAGs and to guide
subsequent analysis resides outside the study data. Hence,
there can be no causal inference without background
knowledge [5,7]. To appreciate the causal approach to the
paradoxes, consider the three-variable model of birth
weight (BW), current weight (CW), and blood pressure
(BP) used by the authors and seen in the life course epide-
miology literature. In addition to the directed graphs pre-
sented by the authors, I have added a few additional, non-
trivial, and non-redundant (although by no means
exhaustive) graphs that could have generated their
observed correlations (Figures 1 to 7).
Now, suppose there are no other unmeasured covariates
given the DAGs in Figures 1 to 7. If Figure 1 is the true state
of affairs, to estimate the total effect of BW on BP, the
unadjusted analysis will suffice. If, however, Figure 2 or 3
applies, then the adjusted (that is conditional on CW) is
needed to estimate the total effect of BW on BP. This is
because conditioning on CW will block the back-door BW
to BP: BW←CW→BP in Figure 2 or BW←U→CW→BP in
Figure 3. The reader could by now have doubts about the
correctness of Figure 2 where a later observation CW is a
confounder of the effect of BW on BP since one could
argue that, by occurring after BW, CW could not be seen
as a common cause of both BW and BP. (See Hernán et al
[8] for an accessible defence of the structural approach to
confounding and selection bias using DAGs.) Nonethe-
less, while temporality seemingly excludes CW as a con-
founder in Figure 2, it does not exclude CW from ever
being part of a confounding path as seen in Figure 3. Both
BW and CW are more likely to be the result of a common
DAG showing a scenario where birth weight (BW) has a causal effect on and shares a common cause – current weight (CW) – with blood pressure (BP)Figur  2
DAG showing a scenario where birth weight (BW) 
has a causal effect on and shares a common cause – 
current weight (CW) – with blood pressure (BP). That 
is, the relationship between BW and BP is confounded by CW.
BW BP
CW
Directed acyclic graph (DAG) showing that birth weight (BW) has  direct effect as well as an indirect effect via cur-rent w ight (CW) on blood pressure (BP)Figur  1
Directed acyclic graph (DAG) showing that birth 
weight (BW) has a direct effect as well as an indirect 
effect via current weight (CW) on blood pressure 
(BP).
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edge and common sense, Figure 3 is more plausible than
2. Therefore, temporality cannot be used to judge whether
a variable is a confounder, part of a sufficient subset of
covariates needed to block a backdoor, or not [5].
Figure 4 presents a scenario where the unadjusted effect of
BW on BP is the correct estimate since CW is a collider
(that is, without conditioning, it already acts as a blocker)
in the DAG depicting two unobserved common causes of
BW and CW and of CW and BP. This scenario is closely
related to that in Figure 5 where BW has no effect on, but
shares an unobserved common cause (U3) with, BP. In all
scenarios, our choice of which (unadjusted or adjusted)
estimate to use is not based on the magnitude or direction
of the estimate but on the governing causal relations. Put
this way, Simpson's paradox becomes a problem of cov-
ariate adjustment (when to adjust or not) in the causal
analysis of non-experimental or observational data. The
paradox arises due to the causal interpretation of the
observation that the proportion of a given level of BW is
evidence for making an educated guess of the proportion
DAG where, like in Figure 2, the effect of birth weight (BW) on blood pressure (BP) is confounded by cu rent weight (CW) ich itself has an unmeas red ommon cause (U) with BPFigure 6
DAG where, like in Figure 2, the effect of birth 
weight (BW) on blood pressure (BP) is confounded by 
current weight (CW) which itself has an unmeasured 




DAG depicting each variable pair – BW/CW, CW/BP, or BW/BP – as being connected only by an unmeasured common cause (U1, U2 or U3 respectively)Figure 5
DAG depicting each variable pair – BW/CW, CW/BP, 
or BW/BP – as being connected only by an unmeas-





DAG showing where, in addition to its effect on blood pres-sure (BP), b rth weight (BW) shares an unmeasured common cause (U) ith current weigh  (CW) which als  has an effect on BPFigure 3
DAG showing where, in addition to its effect on 
blood pressure (BP), birth weight (BW) shares an 
unmeasured common cause (U) with current weight 




DAG showing where birth weight (BW) has a direct effect on blood pressure (BP) and shar s an unmeasure  common cause (U1) with cur t weight (CW) which itself has ano herunm asured common cause (U2) with BPFigure 4
DAG showing where birth weight (BW) has a direct 
effect on blood pressure (BP) and shares an unmeas-
ured common cause (U1) with current weight (CW) 
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the third related covariate CW is unknown [5]. What we
really want to answer is "Does BW cause BP?", not "Does
observing BW allow us to predict BP?".
As Pearl has noted [5], people think "causes", not propor-
tions (the thing that drives the paradox in Simpson's par-
adox); "reversal" is possible in the calculus of proportions
but impossible in the calculus of causes. Put in Pearl's
causal language, the invariance of causal interpretation
that is wrongly used to interpret evidence of reversal in
proportions in Simpson's paradox is as follows:
Pr(BP=high | do{BW=high}, high CW) < Pr(BP=high | 
do{BW=low}, high CW) (1)
Pr(BP=high | do{BW=high}, low CW) < Pr(BP=high | 
do{BW=low}, low CW) (2)
where, according to our causal intuition, the combined or
unadjusted analysis should be:
Pr(BP=high | do{BW=high}) < Pr(BP=high | 
do{BW=low}) (3)
The inequalities in (1), (2) and (3) reflect the "sure thing
principle" which when applied to Tu et al's paper would
then go as follows: an action do{BW} which decreases the
probability of the event BP in each CW subpopulation
must also decrease the probability of BP in the whole pop-
ulation, provided that the action do{BW} does not change
the distribution of the CW subpopulations. See Pearl [5]
for a formal proof, although the sure thing principle fol-
lows naturally from the semantics of actions as modifiers
of mechanisms, as embodied by the do(·) operator. What
is numerically observed in Simpson's paradox, however, is
Pr(BP=high | BW=high) > Pr(BP=high | BW=low)
(4)
which goes against our causal intuition or inclination to
think "causes". If the DAG represented in Figure 3 – or, for
the sake of argument, Figure 2 – applies, then we must
consult the conditional analysis represented by inequali-
ties 1 and 2, not the observed unconditional analysis in
inequality 4. In this context, inequality 4 can only be seen
as an evidence of BP that BW provides in the absence of
information on CW, not as a statement of the causal effect
of BW on BP which is what inequality 3 captures [5]. That
is, Simpson's paradox arises because once CW is unknown
to us, and we observe, for instance, that the proportion of
{BW=high} is higher than that of {BW=low}, we have
evidence for predicting (as in inequality 4) that the
observable proportion of {BP=high} would also be
higher than that of {BP=low} in the non-experimental
data, but we cannot take this observation to imply that
{BW=high} causes {BP=high} which goes against our
causal knowledge that doing{BW=low} causes {BP=high}
as depicted in inequality 3. Hence, prediction does not
imply aetiology. The former tends to deal with usually
transitory proportions whereas the latter deals with invar-
iant causal relations.
A further illustration of the futility of the continued statis-
tical discussion of the paradoxes is captured in the discus-
sion of the suppression effect: how an unrelated covariate
(CW) "increases the overall model fit ...assessed by R2..."
[1]. Tu et al should not be surprised that suppression is lit-
tle known in epidemiology because epidemiologists do
not and should not use the squared multiple-correlation-
coefficient R2 as a measure of goodness-of-fit. As Tu et al
algebraically admit, R2 is only an indication of the propor-
tion of the variance in BP or outcome that is attributable
to the variation in the fitted mean of BP [9]. It is known
that the expected value of R2 can increase as more and
even unrelated variables are added to the model thus
making it a useless criterion for guiding covariate selec-
tion [10].
Furthermore, Tu et al make a passing mention of direct
effect versus indirect effect (as might be the case in the
consideration of adjustment in Figure 1). This is, of
course, beyond the scope of their paper and, therefore, my
commentary. I refer the curious reader to the important
work on the complex issues involved in the estimation of
direct effect [3,5,11-14]. Suffice it to say that, in common
situations where total effect estimation is possible, direct
effect may be unidentifiable. For instance, although all
DAG depicting a modification of Figure 1 where CW has a common cause (U) with BPFigure 7
DAG depicting a modification of Figure 1 where CW 
has a common cause (U) with BP. In the directed path 
BW→CW←U→BP, CW acts as a collider if left uncontrolled 
for in the analysis of the effect of BW on BP.
BW BP
CW
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effects of BW on BP can still be consistently estimated
even in a scenario where there is an additional unob-
served common cause (U) of CW and BP as in Figure 6
(modified from Figure 2), the direct effect of BW on BP
cannot be identified without measuring U in Figure 7
which is a similar modification of Figure 1. Like Pearl [5]
and Holland and Rubin [15], I take these paradoxes to be
related to causal concepts which are, thus, best under-
stood in the context of causal analysis.
In conclusion, it cannot be overemphasized that although
Simpson's and related paradoxes reveal the perils of using
statistical criteria to guide causal analysis, they hold nei-
ther the explanations of the phenomenon they purport to
depict nor the pointers on how to avoid them. The expla-
nations and solutions lie in causal reasoning which relies
on background knowledge, not statistical criteria. It is
high time we stopped treating misinterpreted signs and
symptoms ('paradoxes'), and got on with the business of
handling the disease ('causality'). We should rightly turn
our attention to the perennial problem of covariate selec-
tion for causal analysis using non-experimental data.
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